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ROGUES' RIGHTS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE LIBEL-PROOF PLAINTIFF DOCTRINE
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing,
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the doctrine has not been codified, judges in
several jurisdictions have held that a person's reputation
may be so tarnished that it could not be lowered in the eyes of
the community.2 Such persons are considered "libel-proof' as
a matter of law, and are thus precluded from bringing a libel
case to trial.3 A doctrine stating that a person is incapable of
being defamed denies that person due process and equal pro-
tection under the law.
Justifications for the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine are
deeply flawed. Identifying certain plaintiffs as beyond the
scope of libel law effectively makes these plaintiffs outlaws in
the classic sense,4 and American jurisprudence rejects out-
1. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1.01 at 1-2 (1992) (quoting
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3 in COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE: THE CAMBRIDGE TEXT 995, 971 (1980)).
2. See generally id § 9.10[4][d].
3. Defendants have successfully moved for dismissal or summary judg-
ment on grounds that the plaintiff is libel-proof. See, e.g., Cardillo v. Doubleday
& Co., 518 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1975); Ray v. Time, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 618 (W.D.
Tenn. 1976), af/'d, 582 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1977); and Wynberg v. National En-
quirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924 (C.D. Cal. 1982). As recently as May 1993, a libel
case brought by convicted serial killer Randy Kraft was dismissed because the
trial court found Kraft libel-proof. Convicted Killer Says Book Defames Him,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 14, 1993, at 3B; Killer is 'Libel-Proof; Lawsuit
Dismissed, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 15, 1993, at 3B.
4. "The libel-proof plaintiff is an outcast of the law of defamation whose
reputation may be kicked and trod upon with impunity." SMOLLA, supra note 1,
§ 9.10[4][d] at 9-25. See also Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069
(3d Cir. 1988), in which the plaintiffs argued that applying the doctrine would
"declare open season on libel proof plaintiffs." Id. at 1081.
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lawry. Treating a person as beyond the scope and protection
of the law is contrary to the basic tenets of our society.'
Even without the judicially created libel-proof plaintiff
doctrine, defenses and privileges applicable to libel cases suf-
ficiently protect First Amendment interests of defendants. If
a libel plaintiffs reputation is tarnished, the defendant pub-
lisher can assert truth as a defense, supplying evidence that
the allegedly defamatory statement is at least substantially
true in its implication.' If the plaintiff is a public official or a
public figure, the plaintiff cannot prevail absent a showing
that the defendant published the allegedly libelous statement
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether or not it was false.7 Further, the plaintiff must
prove the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard with
convincing clarity.8 Given these substantial barriers to re-
covery in libel actions, there is simply no need to identify cer-
tain plaintiffs as libel-proof.
This comment traces the development of both the issue-
specific and the incremental harm branches of the libel-proof
plaintiff doctrine.' The comment then sets forth the central
question of a libel plaintiffs right of access to the courts, ana-
lyzing this question from the standpoint of due process and
equal protection. 10 Concluding that the libel-proof plaintiff
doctrine violates fundamental constitutional rights, this com-
ment proposes abrogation of the doctrine and suggests other
avenues open to libel defendants who wish to protect them-
selves against meritless claims.'1
II. BACKGROUND
A. Brief Overview of Libel Law
Defamation can be defined as a communication that ex-
cites adverse, derogatory, or unpleasant feelings or opinions
5. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 453, 457 (1969). The court
ruled that persons with criminal records "must be assured that they have a
stake in our society, and that they can achieve justice by application to the law
and its guardians." Id. at 457. See also infra text accompanying notes 184-88.
6. See Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924, 927 (C.D.
Cal. 1982).
7. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
8. Id. at 285-86.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 56-161.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 179-261.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 262-72.
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against the plaintiff.12 Both written and oral communica-
tions may be actionable if defamatory; libel encompasses
written communications, and slander addresses oral ones.
13
As one commentator notes, an examination of the valid-
ity of a "slander-proof plaintiff doctrine" would differ substan-
tially from a discussion of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, be-
cause slander actions differ from libel actions in significant
respects.' 4 The torts have different histories,' 5 and slander is
generally actionable only upon proof of actual, pecuniary
harm to the plaintiff.16 This comment is limited to a discus-
sion of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine.
At English common law, libel was actionable even if the
plaintiff could not prove any impairment of reputation or
other harm as a result.' 7 Juries sometimes awarded substan-
tial sums in compensation for the purported harm to the
plaintiffs reputation, even where no such harm was proven.',
Until the 1960's, American courts generally considered mat-
ter defamatory on its face and unambiguous to be actionable
per se; accordingly, harm was presumed.' 9
In recent years, however, American courts have nar-
rowed the contours of the tort of libel in the interest of pro-
tecting free speech and freedom of the press.20 Libel cases
require the courts to "chart the proper course between the
Scylla of inadequately guaranteeing First Amendment pro-
12. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 111 at 773 (5th ed. 1984). Keeton cites several definitions of defamation,
ranging from the narrow (communication that "tends to hold the plaintiff up to
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided") to the
broad (communication that "tends to so harm the reputation of another as to
lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating with him"). Id. at 773-74.
13. Id. § 112 at 785.
14. David Marder, Note, Libel-Proof Plaintiffs-Rabble Without a Cause, 67
B.U. L. REV. 993, n.3 (1987).
15. KEETON et al., supra note 12, § 112, at 785. Libel was criminal in origin,
and remains a common law crime, but slander was never criminal in itself, and
could only become criminal when the words constituted some other offense
(such as sedition, blasphemy, or breach of the peace). Id.
16. Id. § 112, at 793-94.
17. Id. § 112, at 795.
18. Id. See also Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50
T.L.R. 581 (1934) (jury awarded £25,000 to plaintiff, a Russian aristocrat, who
claimed that defendant's characterization of a Russian noblewoman seduced by
Rasputin libeled her).
19. KEETON, et al., supra note 12, § 112, at 795-96.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 24-40.
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tections and the Charybdis of diminishing an individual's
right to reputation."2 1 The courts have recognized a strong
interest in preventing or vindicating attacks on reputation,2 2
likening libelous speech to constitutionally unprotected
"fighting words."23 Nevertheless, in the mid-1960's, the bal-
ance between plaintiffs' and defendants' interests in libel
cases began to shift in favor of defendants.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,24 the Supreme Court
found that libel laws could lead to self-censorship, thus deter-
ring public criticism of official conduct.25 To prevent such
censorship, the Court held that public officials could not re-
cover damages for defamatory falsehoods relating to their of-
ficial conduct absent proof that the statements were made
with "actual malice," which the Court defined as "knowledge
that [the statement] was false or . . .reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."26 Quoting Sweeney v. Patter-
son, the Court decreed that imposing liability for "erroneous
reports of the political conduct of officials reflect[s] the obso-
lete doctrine that the governed must not criticize their gover-
nors ... ."28 Thus, after New York Times, a plaintiffs right to
recover damages in a libel action depended not only upon the
defendant's conduct, but also upon the plaintiffs profession
or role in society.
21. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1075 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
22. Marder, supra note 14, at 995 (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86
(1966)).
23. See id. at 996 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942)).
24. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25. Id. at 279. The Court reasoned that a rule compelling critics of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions or else risk libel
judgments of potentially unlimited amounts would deter any such criticism. Id.
"The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is
inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id.
26. Id. at 279-80. Additionally, the Court reasoned, the Constitution man-
dates that actual malice be proven with "convincing clarity." Id. at 285-86. See
also, e.g., Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., No. 91-3948, 1993 WL 265034
(6th Cir. July 20, 1993), in which the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
granting of a directed verdict for the defendants because the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants acted negli-
gently in their publication of the allegedly libelous statements.
27. 128 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942).
28. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272.
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The Court expanded the "Times malice" standard some-
what in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,29 where the plaintiff,
a college football coach, was merely a "public figure" and not
a public official.3 0 In Curtis, the Court held that such a pub-
lic figure could recover damages for a defamatory falsehood
upon a showing of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting
an extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publish-
ers."31 Absent such extreme negligence by the defendant,
however, the public-figure plaintiff could not recover dam-
ages for libel.
The libel plaintiffs right to recovery was further circum-
scribed in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.32 Although the Gertz
Court held that defamation of a private individual is not pro-
tected by constitutional privilege, it also sought to protect the
media from "the rigors of strict liability for defamation."33
Ruling that the state interest in the protection of reputation
"extends no further than compensation for actual injury, " 31
the Court barred recovery of presumed or punitive damages
when liability is not based on Times malice. 5
Two years after Gertz, the Court was asked to define "ac-
tual injury" in the context of libel. In Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone,36 the Supreme Court established that "actual injury"
encompasses not only harm to the plaintiffs reputation, but
humiliation and mental anguish as well. The Court held
that libel plaintiffs may recover damages for emotional dis-
29. 388 U.S. 130 (1967), conformed to Associated Press v. Walker, 418 S.W.
2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.), reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967), error refused, cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968). An article in the Saturday Evening Post accused
Butts of conspiring to "fix" a football game. Id. at 135.
30. Id. at 148.
31. Id. at 155.
32. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
33. Id. at 348.
34. Id. at 349.
35. Id. at 350. In justifying a high standard of proof for plaintiffs, the Court
reasoned that any liability system encompassing presumed and punitive dam-
ages could potentially "inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment free-
doms." Id. at 349.
36. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
37. The plaintiff sued a magazine publisher for anxiety and concern result-
ing from a defamatory article about her divorce; the article erroneously claimed
she had been found guilty of adultery. Id. at 449-52. Although the plaintiff
could not show that her reputation had been harmed, the Court noted that emo-
tional distress falls within the Gertz requirement of actual injury. Id. at 460.
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tress even though actual injury to reputation is minimal.38
Further, in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,39 the
Court ruled that plaintiffs may recover presumed and puni-
tive damages if the libel does not involve matters of public
concern, "even absent a showing of 'actual malice. '"' 40
In summary, public-official and public-figure plaintiffs
must prove "Times malice" (which can include extreme negli-
gence) in order to recover in libel actions, and private-figure
plaintiffs must prove at least negligence. 41 Although the
plaintiff must meet a high standard of proof to recover dam-
ages for libel, damage to reputation is not the only ground for
recovery; emotional distress damages, presumed damages,
and punitive damages have also been awarded.42
B. Development of the Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine
The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine originated in Cardillo v.
Doubleday & Co., Inc.43 Cardillo, a prison inmate, sued the
authors and publishers of a book mentioning his alleged par-
ticipation in various criminal activities.44 The court noted
that Cardillo had been convicted of several federal felonies in
Florida, Maryland, and New Hampshire, 45 as well as "numer-
ous minor infractions of the law" in Massachusetts. 46 Addi-
tionally, the court found that Cardillo knowingly associated
with criminals and had been involved in several minor crimes
with one of the book's authors.47 Accordingly, the Second Cir-
cuit declared, as a matter of law, that Cardillo was libel-proof
38. Id. at 460-61.
39. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). Plaintiff sued Dun & Bradstreet for damages from
a highly inaccurate credit report, which the defendant failed to fully correct. Id.
at 751-52.
40. Id. at 761.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 24-33.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
43. 518 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1975).
44. Id. at 638. Thomas Renner and Vincent Teresa wrote the book, entitled
My Life In The Mafia. The book portrayed Teresa as a high-ranking figure in
organized crime, and Cardillo was mentioned in the book as participating in
specific crimes with Teresa, including a robbery and the fixing of a certain horse
race. Id. at 639-40.
45. These included bail-jumping, conspiracy, and interstate transportation
of stolen securities. Id. at 640.
46. Id.
47. Id. The court also cited testimony before a congressional committee re-
garding Cardillo's frequenting of a place where "'the mob generally hung out.'"
Id.
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for the purposes of this case; "i.e., so unlikely by virtue of his
life as a habitual criminal to be able to recover anything other
than nominal damages as to warrant dismissal of the case,
involving as it does First Amendment considerations." 48 The
court further opined that given Cardillo's record and associa-
tions, "we cannot envisage any jury awarding, or court sus-
taining, an award under any circumstances for more than a
few cents' damages,"49 even if Cardillo could prevail on the
legal issues.5 0 Thus, the court apparently discounted the pos-
sibility that Cardillo might have grounds for recovery other
than for damage to his admittedly besmirched reputation.
From its first articulation in Cardillo, the libel-proof
plaintiff doctrine developed along two branches: the "issue-
specific" branch and the "incremental harm" branch.5 ' Under
the issue-specific branch, a court may determine that a plain-
tiff's reputation is so tarnished with respect to a particular
issue that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is libel-proof re-
garding that issue.52 By contrast, a court applying the incre-
mental harm branch examines an entire communication to
determine the degree of harm inflicted by the allegedly
libelous statements.53 If the court finds that the actionable
statements cause the plaintiff no appreciable harm beyond
that caused by the non-actionable statements, the court may
dismiss the case.54 The following sections trace the develop-
ment of each branch of the doctrine.55
1. The "Issue-Specific" Branch
A year after Cardillo was decided, the Second Circuit
confronted the libel-proof plaintiff defense in Buckley v. Lit-
48. Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d 638, 639 (2d Cir. 1975). The
court did not elaborate on the nature of the First Amendment considerations it
perceived here. Id. at 639-40.
49. Id. at 640.
50. Id.
51. See generally Note, The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, 98 HARv. L. REV.
1909 (1985) [hereinafter The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine]. According to
Marder, the term "issue-specific" was first used in The Libel-Proof PlaintiffDoc-
trine and may be a misnomer. See Marder, supra note 14, at 993 n.4.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 56-119.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 120-61.
54. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1182 (1986).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 56-161.
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tell.56 Franklin H. Littell had written a book in which he
characterized William F. Buckley, Jr. as a "fellow traveler" of
totalitarians. 7 Littell claimed that Buckley's publications
printed items "picked up from the openly fascist journals
[and] repeat[ed] radical right malice and rumor."58  The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York entered a judgment for Buckley,5 9 and Littell
appealed.6 °
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the claim that
William F. Buckley, Jr. was libel-proof according to the ra-
tionale of Cardillo1.6  Although the court found that Buckley
was a principal spokesperson for a controversial political po-
sition, it hastened to add that Buckley's reputation was one
that "could suffer under the onus of defamation."62 The court
reasoned that, like the victims of McCarthyism who had occu-
pied prominent positions in broadcasting, Buckley's reputa-
tion could be damaged even though he had the communica-
tions resources to answer a false and defamatory attack.6 3
According to the court, the libel-proof doctrine articulated in
Cardillo was "a limited, narrow one, which we will leave con-
fined to its basic factual context." 4 Thus, the Second Circuit
appeared to restrict the doctrine to plaintiffs who are habit-
ual criminals.6
56. 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
57. Id. at 884 & n.1 (quoting FRANKLIN LITTELL, WiLD TONGUES: A HAND-
BOOK OF SOCIAL PATHOLOGY (1969)).
58. Id. at 885 & n.1 (quoting FRANKLiN LITTELL, WiLD TONGUES: A HAND-
BOOK OF SOCIL PATHOLOGY (1969)).
59. Buckley v. Littell, 394 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
60. Id.
61. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1062 (1977). Interestingly, the opinion was written by Judge Oakes, au-
thor of the opinion in Cardillo. Id. at 884.
62. Id. at 889.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. The Cardillo reasoning was applied in Ray v. Time, Inc., 452 F. Supp.
618 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), aff'd 582 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1978), in which James Earl
Ray, a convicted felon and the confessed murderer of Martin Luther King, Jr.,
was held to be libel-proof as to defendant's article characterizing Ray as a "nar-
cotics addict and peddler." Id. at 622. As "a convicted habitual criminal" un-
likely to recover damages in light of his background and criminal activities, the
court dismissed Ray's action as frivolous. Id. See also Logan v. District of Co-
lumbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1978), where plaintiff, an admitted drug user
with an extensive criminal record, sued defendant for false statements concern-
ing plaintiffs drug use. Id. at 1330. Citing Cardillo, the court held the plaintiff
[Vol. 34
ROGUES' RIGHTS
However, the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California extended the doctrine, applying it to
a plaintiff who was not a habitual criminal (but who had a
criminal record) in Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc.66
Henry Wynberg had a "brief but celebrated 'close personal re-
lationship'" with Elizabeth Taylor.67 The National Enquirer
published an article alleging that Wynberg had used this re-
lationship for his own financial gain. 8 In its opinion, the
court asserted that Wynberg's prior criminal convictions,
which had been highly publicized, 69 damaged his general rep-
utation sufficiently that he could recover "only nominal dam-
ages for subsequent defamatory statements."7 °
The Wynberg court conceded the difficulty of determining
the proper accommodation between libel law and First
Amendment freedoms, but noted that prior federal and state
decisions provided trial courts with "flexible rules" for resolv-
ing such conflicts. 71 The court decreed that when "an individ-
ual engages in conspicuously anti-social or even criminal be-
havior, which is widely reported to the public, his reputation
diminishes proportionately." 72 Abandoning the Cardillo limi-
tation of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine to habitual
criminals, the Wynberg court reasoned that criminal or anti-
social conduct diminishing a person's reputation could make
that person libel-proof as a matter of law regarding that spe-
cific conduct. 73 Eventually, according to the court, the per-
son's reputation for specific conduct, or the person's general
libel-proof as a matter of law. Id. at 1332. But see Guccione v. Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987), in
which the Second Circuit expressly stated that the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine
is not limited to plaintiffs with criminal records. Id. at 303. See also infra text
accompanying notes 77-87.
66. 564 F. Supp. 924 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
67. Id. at 925.
68. Id. at 925 & n.3.
69. Id. at 928. Wynberg's convictions included contributing to the delin-
quency of minors involving sex and drugs, bribery, prostitution, grand theft,
and fraud. Id. at 928.
70. Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924, 927-28 (C.D. Cal.
1982).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 928.
73. Id. One commentator was unconvinced that the court would apply the
libel-proof plaintiff doctrine in the absence of criminal behavior. According to
Marder, the court failed to clarify whether anti-social conduct that is not crimi-
nal could trigger the doctrine. See Marder, supra note 14, at 1001.
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reputation for honesty and fair dealing, could sink so low as
to render that person libel-proof on all issues.7 4 As to
Wynberg himself, the court found that due to his specific
criminal conduct and its attendant publicity, "it is beyond dis-
pute.., that [Wynberg's] ... general reputation for integrity,
truth, honesty, and fair dealing in personal and business
matters is bad."75 Accordingly, the court granted the defend-
ant's summary judgment motion.76
In Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,77 the Second Cir-
cuit departed from its position in Buckley78 and declared that
the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is not confined to plaintiffs
with criminal records.79 Robert Guccione, publisher of Pent-
house magazine, sued Hustler Magazine over an article alleg-
ing that Guccione was married and also had a "live-in girl-
friend, Kathy Keeton." 0 In "a boisterous trial that gave new
meaning to the term 'adversary proceeding,'" 8 1 Guccione con-
tended that although he and Ms. Keeton had been living to-
gether during his marriage to Muriel Guccione, he and Mrs.
Guccione were divorced prior to the article's publication. 82
Guccione argued that because he had not been convicted of
the crime of adultery, he could not be held libel-proof regard-
ing that issue.8 3 The court disagreed, ruling that plaintiffs
may be rendered libel-proof by evidence apart from criminal
convictions.8 4 Although the court conceded that "few plain-
74. Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924, 928 (C.D. Cal.
1982). As noted by Marder, supra note 14, at 1002, Wynberg directly contra-
dicts the holding in Buckley, which limited the doctrine to cases in which a
plaintiff is libel-proof only regarding the specific issues on which the plaintiffs
reputation has been tarnished. Therefore, "Wynberg may represent a substan-
tial expansion of the doctrine, rendering the term 'issue-specific' a misnomer in
this jurisdiction." Marder, supra note 14, at 1002.
75. Wynberg, 564 F. Supp. at 928.
76. Id. at 930.
77. 800 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
78. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1062 (1977).
79. Guccione, 800 F.2d at 303.
80. Id. at 299. Magazines published by Guccione contained articles that
advocate extramarital sexual relations. Id. at 300.
81. Id. at 299.
82. Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 299 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
83. Id. at 303.
84. Id. In particular, the court noted Guccione's testimony that from 1966
until 1979, his relatives, friends, and business associates knew he was living
with Ms. Keeton while still legally married. Id. at 304.
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tiffs will have so bad a reputation that they are not entitled to
obtain redress for defamatory statements,"8" it had little
sympathy for those unfortunate few plaintiffs. The court rea-
soned that "where an allegedly libelous statement cannot re-
alistically cause impairment of reputation, . . . the claim
should be dismissed so that the costs of defending against the
claim of libel, which can themselves impair vigorous freedom
of expression, will be avoided."
8 6
The Guccione court noted that Guccione had not restored
his reputation between the time the Hustler statements
would have been true and the time the article was actually
published, 7 thus raising the question of how recent a libelous
statement must be to have a perceived impact on the plain-
tiffs reputation. The Fifth Circuit addressed this question in
Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc."" In Zerangue, two Louisi-
ana law enforcement officers sued a newspaper publisher
over two articles erroneously stating that the officers had
been convicted of felonies rather than of misdemeanor mal-
feasance.8 " The articles appeared nearly six years after the
convictions. 90 Defendant TSP Newspapers argued that the
plaintiffs, as law enforcement officers stripped of their offices
and jailed, were libel-proof; the plaintiffs replied that in the
intervening six years, they had restored their reputations. 91
The Fifth Circuit ultimately affirmed the trial court's holding
that whether or not the plaintiffs were libel-proof was a ques-
tion for the jury.9 2 Courts have admitted articles published
as much as eight years before the fact to show that a plaintiff
is libel-proof,93 leaving unanswered the question of when, if
ever, a plaintiffs tarnished reputation could be deemed
rehabilitated.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 303. The court decreed that in libel-proof plaintiff cases, even
nominal damages may not be awarded. Id.
87. Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 304 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
88. 814 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1987).
89. Id. at 1067-69.
90. Id. at 1068-69.
91. Id. at 1074.
92. Id.
93. Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 932 F.2d 495, 501 (6th Cir.
1991) (citing Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 304 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987)).
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Not all federal courts have embraced the libel-proof
plaintiff doctrine. The Third Circuit declined to apply the is-
sue-specific branch of the doctrine in Marcone v. Penthouse
International Magazine for Men.94 In 1976, Frank J. Mar-
cone, an attorney who represented motorcycle gangs,95 was
indicted by a grand jury for conspiring to possess marijuana
with intent to distribute.96 The charges were subsequently
withdrawn, 97 but in 1978, Penthouse published an article in-
cluding Marcone in a list of "attorney criminals."98 On appeal
from a judgment in Marcone's favor, Penthouse argued that
Marcone's highly publicized drug indictment, his notorious
relationship with motorcycle gangs engaged in illegal activ-
ity, and his widely reported 1978 trial for income tax evasion
made him, in effect, libel-proof before the publication of the
allegedly libelous statement and therefore entitled only to
nominal damages. 99 Rather than declaring Marcone libel-
proof, however, the Third Circuit ruled that "[e]vidence of a
tarnished reputation is admissible and should be considered
as a factor to mitigate the level of compensatory damages."100
The court found that the jury had been informed of the evi-
dence regarding Marcone's reputation, and that its verdict for
compensatory damages of $30,000 may have reflected Mar-
cone's diminished status as of 1978.101
In Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos.,102 the Sixth
Circuit also declined to apply the issue-specific branch. ABC
television personality Geraldo Rivera traveled to Akron, Ohio
to investigate rumors concerning a local judge's alleged cor-
ruption. 0 3 Rivera suspected that William G. Brooks, an Ak-
ron resident with a substantial and slightly publicized crimi-
94. 754 F.2d 1072, 1079 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
95. Id. at 1076. Marcone also associated with these gangs "on a non-profes-
sional basis." Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. An assistant United States Attorney said the charges were dropped
because of "'legal technicalities' tying Marcone to the larger conspiracy" involv-
ing defendants in the United States and Canada. Id.
98. Id. at 1077. The article also stated that the charges against Marcone
were dropped because he cooperated with further investigations. Id.
99. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1078-79
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
100. Id. at 1079.
101. Id. at 1077, 1079.
102. 932 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1991).
103. Id. at 496. These rumors stated that the judge persuaded women to
have sex with him in exchange for favorable rulings in certain cases. Id.
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nal record, was assisting the judge by intimidating those who
might testify against the judge.1 °4 A 1980 episode of ABC's
20 /20 broadcast Rivera's and others' negative remarks about
Brooks, to the effect that Brooks was the judge's "hitman,"
and that Brooks was a "pimp," a "muscleman," and a "street
knowledgeable jive turkey."10 5 The district court granted
ABC's motion for summary judgment, agreeing with ABC
that Brooks was libel-proof as a matter of law.10 6 On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit called the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine "a
rather loose-woven legal conception of the federal courts,"' 07
indicating that "we may question whether all aspects of the
libel proof doctrine are sound policy." 0 8 Regrettably, the
Brooks court did not address the policy questions (most nota-
bly the question of whether protecting free speech justifies
placing anyone outside the protection of the law), as the court
found genuine issues of material fact that justified allowing
the case to go to a jury.0 9
Only the District of Columbia Circuit flatly rejects the
doctrine. In Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 10 Liberty Lobby
and its founder and treasurer, Willis Carto, sued Jack Ander-
son for writing and publishing three articles that were alleg-
edly libelous."' The articles characterized Carto as "racist,
fascist, anti-Semitic, and a neo-Nazi," and indicated that Lib-
erty Lobby was established to pursue Carto's goals." 2 The
104. Id.
105. Id. at 496-97.
106. Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 737 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ohio),
aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 932 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1991).
107. Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 932 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir.
1991).
108. Id. at 501.
109. Id. at 502. While Brooks was known to some people as an occasionally
violent criminal, the court found that "no popular nationwide television pro-
gram or other publicity had portrayed Brooks as a 'hitman' for a corrupt judge,
a 'pimp,' a 'muscleman,' or a 'street knowledgeable jive turkey.' We leave it to a
trier of fact to determine whether, and to what extent, the '20/20' episode dam-
aged Brooks' reputation." Id. On remand, at the conclusion of Brooks' evidence,
the defendants moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that Brooks had
failed to prove fault-an essential element of his case. Brooks v. American
Broadcasting Cos., No. 91-3948, 1993 WL 265034, at *1-2 (6th Cir. July 20,
1993). The district court's directed verdict was affirmed on appeal. Id.
110. 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242
(1986).
111. Id. at 1565-66.
112. Id. at 1567.
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district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, finding the plaintiffs libel-proof.113
On appeal, the defendants argued both the issue-specific
and the incremental harm theories of the libel-proof plaintiff
doctrine.1 1 4 As to the issue-specific branch, the defendants
contended that the reputations of Liberty Lobby and Carto
had been irreparably damaged by prior publications, thus
rendering them libel-proof.1 1 5 Writing for the majority, then-
District Court Judge Scalia denounced the libel-proof plain-
tiff doctrine as a "fundamentally bad idea."116 Judge Scalia
opined, "we cannot envision how a court would go about de-
termining that someone's reputation had already been 'irrep-
arably' damaged- i.e., that no new reader could be reached
by the freshest libel."1 7 He also asserted that no significant
First Amendment interests are furthered by the doctrine,1 18
declaring that the doctrine is neither part of the law of the
District of Columbia nor part of federal constitutional law.'19
2. The "Incremental Harm" Branch
Under the incremental harm branch of the doctrine, a li-
bel case may be dismissed if non-actionable statements
within an article damage a plaintiffs reputation so greatly
that the harm caused by the actionable statements is mini-
mal.'2 0 This branch of the doctrine was first articulated in
113. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 562 F. Supp. 201 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on
other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
114. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
115. Id. at 1568. See infra text accompanying notes 141-46 for a discussion
of the court's treatment of the defendants' incremental harm theory.
116. Liberty Lobby, 746 F.2d at 1569.
117. Id. at 1568.
118. Id.
119. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1569 (D.C.Cir. 1984),
vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
120. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991);
Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182
(1986); Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
A statement may be non-actionable for reasons other than its substantial
truth. For example, in Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069 (3d
Cir. 1988), the plaintiffs argued that they had valid reasons, including limited
resources and quality of evidence, for challenging only the last portion of the
magazine article at issue, and they had no intention of conceding that the rest
was true. Id. at 1080 n.13.
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Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc.'21 Plaintiff Simmons Ford was a retailer of the CitiCar,
one of two electric cars that received a highly critical review
in the October 1975 issue of Consumer Reports.122 Consum-
ers Union's Auto Test Division rated the CitiCar "Not Accept-
able" based on the car's poor acceleration, low top speed, poor
braking, poor handling, and poor ride, among other
problems. !23 The Auto Test Division submitted its findings to
the defendant's editorial office, and the published article in-
cluded many of these findings.
124
The only portion of the article Simmons Ford challenged
was the portion describing the CitiCar as unsafe for the par-
ticular reason that it did not meet allegedly mandatory fed-
eral safety regulations. 25  Simmons Ford did not contend
that the CitiCar could meet these tests; it merely argued that
the alleged mandatory requirements did not exist for conven-
tional cars, and therefore the article was false.' 26 Granting
summary judgment for the defendants, the court ruled that
"[g]iven the abysmal performance and safety evaluations de-
tailed in the article, plaintiffs could not expect to gain more
than nominal damages based on the addition to the article of
121. 516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). One author contends that Simmons
Ford is a product disparagement action, not a libel case. Marder, supra note 14,
at 1015. "Libel actions ... are not limited to pecuniary harm and thus require
an entirely different analysis from product disparagement actions. Reliance on
Simmons Ford is therefore entirely misplaced and exemplifies the confusion
surrounding this anomalous body of law." Id. at 1015.
122. Simmons Ford at 743-44.
123. Id. at 744 (quoting Two Electric Cars, CONSUMER REP., October 1975, at
596). The Test Division chief stated that the car was "'an extremely dangerous
and unsafe vehicle, wholly unsuited for transportation on the public highway,
and raising a genuine threat of serious injury or death to any person foolhardy
enough to drive one.'" Id. (quoting affidavit of Robert D. Knoll 31, Simmons
Ford v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 516 F. Supp 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (No. 80-
1901)).
124. Id.
125. Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742,
745 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The regulations required life-saving protection to occu-
pants in a 30-mph barrier crash, a 30-mph rollover, and a 20-mph side impact.
After citing these regulations, the article stated, "'[wie believe any such crash
would imperil the lives of persons inside these tiny, fragile, plastic-bodied vehi-
cles.'" Id. at 744-45 (quoting Two Electric Cars, CONSUMER REP., October 1975,
at 596).
126. Id. at 745. Later, the magazine printed a correction of its statement
regarding the federal safety standards, but it reiterated its "'Not Acceptable'"
rating on the other safety grounds detailed in the article. Id. at 746 (quoting
CONSUMER REP., October 1976, at 573).
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the misstatement relating to federal safety standards." 2 7
The court stated that Simmons Ford's reputational interest
in averting further negative comment regarding the safety
and performance of the CitiCar was "minimal when com-
pared with the First Amendment interests at stake." 28
The Second Circuit adopted the incremental harm
branch of the doctrine in Herbert v. Lando.129 In Herbert, the
plaintiff claimed that eleven statements made by the defend-
ants were libelous and made with "Times malice."3 0 On a
motion for summary judgment, the district court had found
nine of the statements non-actionable because there was no
evidence that these statements had been made with actual
malice. 13 1 On appeal, the Second Circuit evaluated the re-
maining two statements under the incremental harm branch
of the doctrine, and dismissed the case. 132 The court decreed
that "[fior Herbert to base his defamation action on subsidi-
ary statements whose ultimate defamatory implications are
themselves not actionable ... would be a classic case of the
tail wagging the dog. "133
Two years after Herbert, the Third Circuit confronted the
incremental harm branch of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine
in Schiavone Construction Co. v. Time, Inc. 134 An article pub-
lished by Time magazine reasserted Ronald Schiavone's
widely reported underworld connections and stated that
Schiavone's name appeared several times in the FBI files on
Jimmy Hoffa's disappearance. 13 5 Schiavone brought a libel
action against Time on the basis of the last paragraph of the
article, 136 which contained the information about the FBI
files.'3 7 The district court granted the defendant's summary
judgment motion because, among other grounds, it ruled that
Schiavone and the other plaintiffs suffered no more than in-
cremental damage from the unchallenged portion of the arti-
127. Id. at 750.
128. Id. at 751.
129. 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).
130. Id. at 304. The eleven challenged statements are listed in the appendix
to the opinion. Id. at 313-14.
131. Id. at 304-07.
132. Id. at 312.
133. Id.
134. 847 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1988).
135. Id. at 1072.
136. Id. at 1075.
137. Id. at 1074.
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cle.'13 On appeal, the Third Circuit explicitly declined to rule
on the viability of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, holding
that depending on how a jury evaluated the sting of the arti-
cle, Schiavone might be able to recover compensatory dam-
ages and thus could not be libel-proof as a matter of law.
139
The District of Columbia Circuit Court attacked this
branch of the doctrine in Liberty Lobby. 140 In the majority
opinion, then-Judge Scalia wrote that the apparently equita-
ble incremental harm doctrine "loses most of its equity when
one realizes that the reason the unchallenged portions are
unchallenged may not be that they are true, but only that
[plaintiffs] were unable to assert that they were willfully
false."' 4 ' The court rejected the incremental harm doctrine
because "it rests upon the assumption that one's reputation is
a monolith, which stands or falls in its entirety." 42 Accord-
ing to Judge Scalia, the law either presumes that "there is a
little bit of good in all of us, [or, alternatively, presumes that]
no matter how bad someone is, he can always be worse."' 43
Judge Scalia went on to state that "[i]t is shameful that Bene-
dict Arnold was a traitor; but he was not a shoplifter to boot,
and one should not have been able to make that charge while
knowing of its falsity with impunity."1
44
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit has adopted only the in-
cremental harm branch of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine,
applying it in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. "4s Jeffrey
Masson, a Sanskrit scholar and psychoanalyst, served for a
time as Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives in
England. 46 Shortly after assuming his post, he became dis-
enchanted with Freudian psychology and began advancing
his own theories regarding Freud.147 Approximately one year
138. Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1511 (D.N.J. 1986),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 847 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1988).
139. Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1075 (3d Cir. 1988).
140. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568-69 (D.C. Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
141. Id. at 1568.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 2419
(1991).
146. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (1991).
147. Id. Specifically, Masson advanced his theories in 1981 at a lecture
before the Western New England Psychoanalytical Society in New Haven, Con-
necticut. Id.
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after his being hired, the Board of the Archives terminated
Masson as Project Director. 148 Janet Malcolm, an author and
contributor to The New Yorker, contacted Masson about the
possibility of an article on his relationship with the
Archives. 149 Masson agreed, and he spoke with Malcolm in a
series of interviews.5 0 Malcolm's article included lengthy
passages enclosed in quotation marks and attributed to Mas-
son, even though the passages were not exact quotes. 5 ' The
work portrayed Masson unflatteringly, and he sued Malcolm
for libel in the District Court for the Northern District of
California. 152
At trial, the district court held that the alleged inaccura-
cies did not raise a jury question, as they were either sub-
stantially true or were rational interpretations of an ambigu-
ous conversation and thus entitled to constitutional
protection. 53 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
summary judgment for defendants, applying the incremental
harm branch of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine and conclud-
ing that "[g]iven the ... many provocative, bombastic state-
ments indisputably made by Masson and quoted by Malcolm,
the additional harm caused by the 'intellectual gigolo' quote
was nominal or nonexistent, rendering the defamation claim
as to this quote non-actionable."' 54 The United States
Supreme Court, however, was unwilling to discount the pos-
sibility that this quote could have harmed Masson's reputa-
148. Id.
149. Id. The article appeared first in The New Yorker Magazine and was
subsequently published as a book by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Id. at 2425.
150. Id. at 2424.
151. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2425-28 (1991).
For example, Malcolm quoted Masson describing the role he played, in his rela-
tionship with Dr. Kurt Eissler (head of the Sigmund Freud Archives) and Dr.
Anna Freud (daughter of Sigmund Freud), as that of an "'intellectual gigolo -
you get your pleasure from him, but you don't take him out in public.'" Id. at
2424-25 (citation omitted). Tape recordings of this interview show that Masson
actually said, "[they felt, in a sense, I was a private asset but a public liabil-
ity.... They liked me when I was alone in their living room,.... [b]ut I was...
much too junior within the hierarchy ... for these important training analysts
to be caught dead with me." Id. at 2426 (citation omitted).
152. Id.
153. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1399 (N.D.
Cal. 1987), affd, 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989), modified, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th
Cir. 1989), rev'd and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
154. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1541 (9th Cir.
1989), rev'd and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
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tion.'15  The Court found that Masson was entitled to argue
that the quote falsely purported to represent the views of
Masson's senior colleagues, and as such could be more dam-
aging than a similar self-appraisal.
156
The Supreme Court expressed reservations concerning
the Ninth Circuit's application of the incremental harm doc-
trine, explaining that the Ninth Circuit's "reasoning requires
a court to conclude that, in fact, a plaintiff made the other
quoted statements and then to undertake a factual inquiry
into the reputational damage caused by the remainder of the
publication. " 157 Moreover, the Court pointed out that the
Ninth Circuit had not indicated whether it considered the in-
cremental harm branch of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine to
be grounded in California law or the First Amendment. 158 To
the extent that the Ninth Circuit had based its ruling on the
First Amendment, the Supreme Court tersely noted that "it
was mistaken." 59 While stating that "we are given no indica-
tion that California accepts this doctrine, though it remains
free to do so,"' 6 0 the Court emphatically "reject[ed] any sug-
gestion that the incremental harm doctrine is compelled as a
matter of First Amendment protection for speech."161 Thus,
the Court's decision in Masson seriously undercuts any con-
stitutional justification for the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine.
C. Access to the Courts
Both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments provide
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
155. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2435-36 (1991).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2436 (citation omitted). The Court noted that "the most 'provoca-
tive, bombastic statements' quoted by Malcolm are those complained of by peti-
tioner, and so this would not seem an appropriate application of the incremen-
tal harm doctrine." Id. (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d
1535, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989)).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2436.
160. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2436 (1991).
161. Id. The Court ultimately reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment and re-
manded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at
2437. Justice White concurred in part and dissented in part, filing an opinion
in which Justice Scalia joined. Id. This dissent does not address the constitu-
tionality of the incremental harm doctrine, but states that if, as a matter of law,
reasonable jurors could not conclude that falsely attributing quotes to Masson
amounted to libel, a motion for summary judgment on this ground would be
justified. Id. at 2438.
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without due process of law. 162 The Fourteenth Amendment
also provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."' 63 While no Constitutional pro-
vision explicitly requires the federal government to provide
equal protection of the laws, the United States Supreme
Court has held that where the federal government makes a
classification which, if made by a state, would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, such a
classification violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause-a clause that is directly applicable to the federal
government. 164
The issue of access to the courts has been analyzed both
as a due process question 16 5 and an equal protection ques-
tion. 166 An equal protection analysis implicitly incorporates
the due process question in libel-proof plaintiff cases. The
classification of plaintiffs as "libel-proof' by a federal judge
raises equal protection scrutiny of the classification itself; if
such a classification violates the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause, it also violates the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. 167
A fundamental principle of equal protection law is that a
classification must treat similarly those persons who are sim-
ilarly situated. 168 In determining whether a classification vi-
olates the Equal Protection Clause, three factors are consid-
ered: (1) the character of the classification in question; (2) the
individual interests affected by the classification; and (3) the
162. U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV, § 1.
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
164. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The Bolling Court held that
racial segregation of District of Columbia public schools violated the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause because the segregation was not reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental objective and was therefore an arbitrary
deprivation of black students' liberty. Id. at 500. Such segregation by the
states would be unconstitutional, so the Court reasoned that "it would be un-
thinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government." Id.
165. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545 (1965).
166. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 385 (Douglas, J., concurring); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
167. See supra text accompanying note 164.
168. See, e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). "[Tlhe
classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary.... so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike." Id. at 415.
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governmental interests asserted in support of the classifica-
tion. 169 Traditionally, cases affecting economic and commer-
cial interests are subject to a lenient standard of judicial re-
view. 170  In such cases, governmental action is typically
upheld if the action is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.171 However, if a classification is considered "sus-
pect" (such as a classification by race), or if the individual in-
terest affected is considered "fundamental," the governmen-
tal action is subject to strict scrutiny-that is, the action will
not be upheld unless the action is necessary to promote a com-
pelling state interest.' 72
At a minimum, due process requires that "absent a coun-
tervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons
forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the ju-
dicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be
heard."1 73 Because due process is explicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution, 74 it is a fundamental right for purposes of
Equal Protection Clause analysis. 75 A state's denial of a fun-
damental right is subject to strict scrutiny under Equal Pro-
tection Clause jurisprudence, even where the denial is not
based on a suspect classification such as race, nationality, or
alienage. 76 One commentator notes that "[s]uch inequalities
are particularly injurious when they interfere with either of
the two major sources of political and legal legitimacy-
namely, voting and litigating-or with the exercise of inti-
169. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1971).
170. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
171. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
172. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971). In Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977), the Court articulated
an intermediate level of scrutiny for gender-based classifications. Id. at 197.
Under this level of scrutiny, "classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives." Id.
173. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
174. U.S. CONST. amend. V & amend. XIV, § 1.
175. Rights either implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution are
considered "fundamental" by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973), reh'g denied,
411 U.S. 959 (1973). "[Tlhe right to due process reflects a fundamental value in
our American constitutional system." Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374.
176. Graham, 403 U.S. at 365.
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mate personal choices."177 Denying libel plaintiffs access to
the courts denies them due process and equal protection.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Statement of the Problem
Traditional analysis of defamation balances the individ-
ual's right to reputation against society's right to free speech
and a free press.171 When a plaintiff is declared libel-proof,
however, the defendant's right to free expression must be bal-
anced against the plaintiffs right to due process and equal
protection under the law. Courts have not directly addressed
this conflict.
B. Due Process and Equal Protection Considerations
1. Character of the Classification
The Equal Protection Clause has been construed to apply
to classifications by race,179 alienage, 80 poverty,"8 and class
or caste.'8 2 The libel-proof plaintiff classification falls within
the last category. By ruling that the plaintiffs character may
be attacked with impunity, the court, in effect, declares the
177. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrTToNAL LAw § 16-7 (2d ed.
1988).
178. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Maga-
zine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
179. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (invalidating state law
prohibiting cohabitation by interracial married couples); Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (invalidating state law restricting jury membership
to white males).
180. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (invalidat-
ing state law denying commercial fishing licenses to aliens).
181. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that a state must pro-
vide a trial transcript or its equivalent to an indigent criminal defendant ap-
pealing the conviction).
182. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating a state law
permitting forced sterilization of "habitual criminals"). Oklahoma's Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act provided for the sterilization of any person who, hav-
ing been convicted two or more times for felonies involving moral turpitude,
was thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and sentenced to impris-
onment in an Oklahoma penal institution. Id. at 536. The Court found that
sterilization of those who have committed grand larceny three times, with im-
munity for those who are embezzlers, amounts to "a clear, pointed, unmistaka-
ble discrimination" that runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 541.
Given this holding, even habitual criminals do not forfeit their right to equal
protection.
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plaintiff to be an outlaw-one outside the protection of the
law. 183
American jurisprudence has rejected the creation of an
outlaw class. 184 In Davis v. United States,185 for example, the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the trial court properly
excluded evidence of a robbery victim's own convictions for
assault, felonious assault, and rape. The court reasoned that
admitting such evidence for the purpose of impeaching the
complainant creates a risk that the jury will "acquit a man
plainly guilty of crime because of their distaste for the victim.
They may, for example, conclude that an established rapist is
not one to complain ... of a robbery."1 8 6 Additionally, the
court found that persons with prior criminal convictions
"must be assured that they have a stake in our society, and
that they can achieve justice by application to the law."1 87 To
indicate otherwise, the court admonished, "would tend to go
contrary to our society's basic tenets, by establishing a kind of
outlaw, outside the protection of the law." 88
In libel-proof plaintiff cases, discrimination according to
this "outlaw" status is particularly egregious, because the la-
bel is applied by only one judge. Evaluation of reputation is
inherently subjective; without a jury to assess the plaintiffs
reputation in the community, the judge's ruling could easily
be arbitrary and capricious. Thus, although the "outlaw"
classification falls outside the more traditional suspect classi-
fications of race and alienage, it arguably leads to discrimina-
tion repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause.
To determine how much harm a plaintiff must allege in
order to bring a libel claim to a jury, the judge must subjec-
183. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *319-20. A person ad-
judicated to be "outlawed" was "put out of the protection of the law, so that he is
incapable of taking the benefit of it in any respect, either by bringing actions or
otherwise." Id. at *319. Prior to Blackstone's time, an outlawed felon was "said
to have caput lupinum, and might be knocked on the head like a wolf by any one
that should meet him, because, having renounced all law, he was to be dealt
with as in a state of nature." Id. at *320.
184. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1969); People v.
Epps, 334 N.E.2d 566 (N.Y. 1975). See also Teresa Stanton Collett, Under-
standing Freedman's Ethics, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 455, 457 (1991). "The law no
longer brands a person 'outlaw,' literally casting that person beyond the protec-
tion of the law." Id.
185. 409 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
186. Id. at 457.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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tively decide what is part of the same "issue" or how much
damage is merely "incremental.""8 9 No clear guidelines exist
for these distinctions. As formulated in Cardillo, the libel-
proof plaintiff doctrine applied originally to "habitual
criminals."'90 However, the Cardillo court did not set forth a
standard for determining how many, or what types of, of-
fenses render a person's criminality sufficiently "habitual" to
trigger the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine. Consequently, even
courts that have applied the doctrine to some plaintiffs with
significant criminal records have hesitated to apply it to
other such plaintiffs. For example, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the judgment of the Western District Court of Tennessee that
James Earl Ray was libel-proof,' 9' but it declined to apply the
doctrine to William Brooks, who also had a criminal past.' 92
Brooks had been taken into police custody 20 times over the
years and had been convicted of numerous felonies, 9 3 but in-
stead of declaring Brooks a libel-proof habitual criminal, the
Sixth Circuit found genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the 20/20 broadcast damaged his reputation. 9 4
Without adequate guidelines for its application, the libel-
proof plaintiff classification is inherently arbitrary, even
within its original context of plaintiffs who are "habitual
criminals." 95
Outside the criminal context, the libel-proof plaintiff
classification is even more arbitrary. As to the issue-specific
branch of the doctrine, the Second Circuit held that William
189. The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, supra note 51, at 1924. One com-
mentator asks:
For example, does being termed a "child molester" in addition to a "rap-
ist" add significant or only incremental damage to the plaintiffs repu-
tation? Or a "crook" and a "liar"? The same questions also arise in the
issue-specific context, with the focus appropriately shifted to the plain-
tiff's reputation instead of the communication itself.
Id. at 1925-26.
190. Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d 638 (1975).
191. Ray v. Time, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), affd 582 F.2d
1280 (6th Cir. 1978).
192. Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 932 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1991).
193. Brooks' criminal convictions included breaking and entering, grand lar-
ceny, first-degree manslaughter, and carrying a concealed weapon under a disa-
bility. Id. at 497.
194. Id. at 501-02.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 43-55.
202 [Vol. 34
ROGUES' RIGHTS
F. Buckley, Jr., a conservative idealogue, 196 was not libel-
proof on the issue of his alleged membership in the "radical
right."19v However, the Second Circuit also held that Robert
Guccione, a similarly outspoken advocate of extramarital
sex,1 98 was libel-proof on the issue of his purported adul-
tery.19 9 As to the incremental harm branch, the Third Circuit
held that a reasonable jury could have found that Ronald
Schiavone had suffered more than incremental harm from
the portion of an article alleging that Schiavone's name ap-
peared in FBI reports on the disappearance of Jimmy
Hoffa, 20 0 even though Schiavone did not challenge the por-
tions of the article reporting his ties to the Mafia.2 ° ' Yet the
Second Circuit held that because Anthony Herbert, whom de-
fendants Barry Lando and Mike Wallace had accused of lying
about reporting war crimes, could not prove that nine of
eleven challenged statements were published with actual
malice, Herbert could not ask a jury to evaluate the harm
caused by the two remaining statements, even if those two
statements were published with the requisite malice.20 2
Thus, in either the criminal or the non-criminal context, and
under either the issue-specific or the incremental harm
branch of the doctrine, the libel-proof plaintiff classification
does not treat similarly those plaintiffs who are similarly
situated.
2. Individual Interests Affected by the Classification
Everyone has a right to have the historical record set
straight. As the Liberty Lobby court noted, "[w]e are not yet
196. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1062 (1977). The court said Buckley could "fairly be described as perhaps the
leading advocate, idealogue or theoretician of conservative political beliefs and
ideas." Id. at 886.
197. Id. at 884.
198. Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
199. Id. at 303-04.
200. Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1080-81 (3d Cir.
1988).
201. Id. at 1080 n.13. The plaintiffs argued that it was unfair to assume
they did not challenge the rest of the article because its allegations were true;
rather, they contended that they had valid reasons (including limited resources
and quality of evidence) for electing to challenge only the last portion of the
article, and that they had no intention of conceding that the rest was true. Id.
202. Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 312 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1182 (1986).
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ready to adopt for the law of libel the principle that 10,000
repetitions are as good as the truth." °3 Our judicial system
exists not only to provide monetary damages, but to resolve
disputes between parties "even if no more than personal
honor is at stake."2 °4 However, the United States Supreme
Court has limited the extent to which equal access to civil
adjudication may be claimed.2 °5 In Boddie v. Connecticut,2 °6
the Court struck down a state law conditioning the granting
of a divorce on the claimant's ability to pay filing fees.20 7 The
Court reasoned that because "the requirement that [the
claimants] resort to the judicial process is entirely a state-
created matter,"20 8 a state may not pre-empt the right to dis-
solve a legal relationship without giving all its citizens access
to the means prescribed for doing S0.209 Nevertheless, in
United States v. Kras, 210 the Court refused to apply this ra-
tionale to indigents' filing of bankruptcy petitions, as bank-
ruptcy is "not the only method available to a debtor for the
adjustment of his legal relationship with his creditors."211
Professor Tribe notes that, given state and federal laws
against forcible self-help, judicial decision may be "the only
lawful mechanism for securing a binding determination
against a recalcitrant opponent in any case. "212 If libel plain-
tiffs are denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard, they
cannot effectively combat the attacks on their reputation, as
their opportunities for self-help may be severely limited.213
The Buckley court acknowledged that William F. Buckley
may have been eminently capable of answering false and de-
famatory attacks with the communications resources at his
command,21 4 yet still upheld his right to recover in a libel ac-
tion.21 5 If a person of Buckley's political prominence, and
203. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
204. Marder, supra note 14, at 1011-12.
205. TRIBE, supra note 177, § 16-11.
206. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
211. Id. at 445.
212. TRIBE, supra note 177, § 16-11.
213. Marder, supra note 14, at 1012.
214. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1062 (1977).
215. Id.
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with Buckley's access to the media, was not left to his own
devices to defend his reputation, why should anyone be? So-
called libel-proof plaintiffs have achieved their tarnished rep-
utations through highly publicized crimes or anti-social
acts.2 16 Given their resultant low place in the public esteem,
their credibility may be so damaged that even if they have
access to channels of mass communication, they may be un-
able to change public opinion.217 As one commentator notes,
"[w]ith little capacity to make an impact on the marketplace
of ideas, such individuals have a strong interest in securing a
judicial forum, the best possible means of vindication."218
By extension, without an effective opportunity to vindi-
cate their reputations, plaintiffs held to be libel-proof may
never be able to restore their reputations. Even if years have
elapsed since the plaintiffs alleged bad acts, courts may deny
recovery on the basis that the plaintiffs reputation has not
been rehabilitated in the interim.219 For example, the Second
Circuit decided that Robert Guccione had not restored his
reputation during the four years prior to the Hustler article,
because of the "long duration" of Guccione's adulterous rela-
tionship and the "relatively short" period between its end and
the article's publication.220 However, the better view is that
of the Fifth Circuit, which agreed with the plaintiffs in Zer-
angue that whether or not they had improved their reputa-
tions during the six years prior to the publication of the alleg-
edly libelous article was a question for the jury.221 Ex-
convicts who have served their time and wish to start a new
life, particularly if they move to a new community where
their past acts are unknown,222 should not be prevented from
protecting a fledgling good reputation merely because little
216. Marder, supra note 14, at 1012.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., Guccione v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 304 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
220. Id.
221. Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d 1066, 1074 (5th Cir. 1987).
The defendants produced no evidence to refute the plaintiffs' contentions, but
simply claimed the arguments were not believable. Id. The court reasoned that
'summary judgment is not an appropriate stage at which to resolve credibility
questions." Id.
222. See Marder, supra note 14, at 1013. "[W]hat is to be done when a plain-
tiffs community does not know of the past convictions? What of the criminal
who has been rehabilitated and wants to start a new life?" Id.
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time has elapsed since their crimes were committed. Such in-
dividuals have a strong interest in protecting their ability to
be accepted as contributing members of their new
communities.
Without a judicial forum, persons about whom society is
mistaken have no recourse. In the case of Leo Frank, for ex-
ample, Frank's reputation in his community led to his convic-
tion for the murder of Mary Phagan.223 Prior to the trial, one
reporter wrote that "'the public has not yet become con-
vinced-and may never become convinced-that Leo Frank is
innocent of the crime for which he has been indicted.' '224
Gossip about the murder so inflamed the Atlanta populace
that some residents doubted an impartial jury could be as-
sembled.225  Had Frank attempted to bring a libel suit
against the newspapers reporting or inciting the gossip, and
had the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine existed at that time, a
judge could have declared Frank libel-proof despite his lack of
a criminal record. As the Brooks court noted, "[c]riminal con-
victions are the well-worn path to achieving libel-proof sta-
tus, but a specific reputation obtained through means such as
newspaper and magazine articles also will suffice."226 The
judge could have considered any false statements non-action-
able if the judge considered Frank's past conduct sufficiently
anti-social,227 or the judge could have concluded that any ac-
tionable statements would cause only incremental harm be-
223. "One of the most infamous outbursts of anti-Semitic feeling in the
United States occurred in Georgia in the years 1913, 1914, and 1915. Leo
Frank, a Northern Jewish industrialist, was convicted of murdering a thirteen-
year-old working girl." LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE Xiii
(1987).
224. Id. at 36 (citation omitted).
225. Id. at 36-37. The defense introduced over one hundred witnesses who
testified to Frank's good character. On cross-examination, the prosecution re-
peatedly asked whether these witnesses had heard of Frank's reputation for
lascivious behavior. "It mattered not how the witnesses responded. [The prose-
cutor] had already said enough to damage Frank's reputation... ." Id. at 51. At
one point during the trial, the prosecutor implied that Frank might be homosex-
ual, and 'the insinuation that Frank indulged himself in this fashion 'went from
mouth to mouth gaining credence as it went.'" Id. (citation omitted).
226. Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 932 F.2d 495, 501 (6th Cir.
1991). See also Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
227. See Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924, 928 (C.D.
Cal. 1982).
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yond that caused by non-actionable ones.2 28 Leo Frank could
not have countered these falsehoods without his day in court.
Frank was ultimately lynched, although evidence discovered
subsequent to his trial indicates that he was innocent.2 29
Precluding libel plaintiffs from seeking vindication may
not lead to their lynching, but certainly prevents them from
proving that public opinion may be unfounded. Suppose, for
example, that a man is in prison for rape and murder. The
local newspaper prints a story saying the man is also a child
molester. Assuming the man lived long enough to bring the
libel action, a judge might declare him libel-proof; however,
his reputation among the prison inmates could have been
damaged to the point where his physical safety, if not his life
itself, would be jeopardized. A judge may be unable or un-
willing to assess the scope of damage to this plaintiffs repu-
tation within the prison community, yet that is precisely the
community having the most direct impact on the plaintiffs
safety during his incarceration.
Without a trial on the merits, a judge cannot be certain
that a libel plaintiffs recovery would be minimal. The plain-
tiff may be entitled to damages for emotional distress, 23° and
to punitive damages even if the defendant has not acted with
malice.23 ' Such awards may be far from nominal in amount.
During the 1980's, the median jury award in libel cases was
$200,000, but in the two years from 1990 through 1992, the
median award had risen to $1,500,000.22 Additionally,
"[r]ecent juries awarded punitive damages in three-quarters
of the defense [sic] victories. By contrast, in the preceding
decade punitives accompanied general damages in roughly
228. See Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1182 (1986).
229. "Frank was arrested and convicted for a murder that he could not possi-
bly have committed but which most Georgians firmly believed he had." DINNER-
STEIN, supra note 223, at x. In 1982, Alonzo Mann, the eighty-two-year-old for-
mer office boy in the firm Frank supervised, stated he had additional evidence
tending to exonerate Frank of the murder. Id. Mann claimed he had seen Jim
Conley, the state's main witness against Frank at trial, carrying a girl's body at
about the time Mary Phagan was murdered. Id. Conley reportedly threatened
to kill Mann if he ever mentioned what he had seen. Id. Mann, thirteen years
old at the time, returned home and told his mother, who advised him not to tell
anyone about Conley and the body. Id. at x-xi.
230. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
231. See Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
232. Gail Diane Cox, Awards for Libel Show Big Rise, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 7,
1992, at 6.
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half the awards."2 3 Those publishers who can mount a sus-
tained defense prevail in only about twenty-five percent of
their post-trial motions for reversals, new trials, or reduced
damages.2 s4 Given these trends, assertions that a libel plain-
tiff would be able to recover only nominal damages rest on
shaky ground indeed. Thus, the individual interests affected
by the libel-proof plaintiff classification include the plaintiffs
interest in setting the record straight in perhaps the only ef-
fective forum for vindication; the interest in rebuilding a
damaged reputation and protecting a new, good one; the in-
terest in compensation for actual injury; and the interest in
punishing the defendant and deterring future wrongful
conduct.
3. Governmental Interests Asserted in Support of the
Classification
In Cardillo, the Second Circuit justified the libel-proof
plaintiff doctrine on the grounds that Cardillo's case "in-
volv[ed] ... First Amendment considerations" 235 without ex-
plaining why these First Amendment considerations were
particularly problematic if the libel plaintiff was a habitual
criminal. Although the Second Circuit found no such First
Amendment problems in Buckley,236 it explained in Guccione
that the cost of defending against a libel claim can impair the
defendant's "vigorous freedom of expression."237 Additionally,
in Schiavone, the defendant argued that "the availability of
punitive damages against newspapers threatens the system
of a free and fearless press that is essential to democracy. "238
In Schiavone, the Third Circuit declined to rule on the consti-
tutionality of punitive damages in cases where the jury
awards only nominal damages to plaintiffs, wisely electing to
"resist the invitation to play leapfrog in this constitutional
minefield."239
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d 638, 639 (2d Cir. 1975).
236. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1062 (1977).
237. Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
238. Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1081 (3d Cir. 1988).
239. Id. at 1082.
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The First Amendment interests purportedly at stake in
libel-proof plaintiff cases are tenuous at best. As the Buckley
court noted, "'there is no constitutional value in false state-
ments of fact.'"24 ° Recovery in libel cases is extremely diffi-
cult, even for plaintiffs not branded as libel-proof.24' As then-
Judge Scalia pointed out in Liberty Lobby,242 where a person
has been widely libeled by reputable sources, the defendant
publisher's good-faith reliance upon those sources provides a
complete defense.243 Judge Scalia did not consider either
proving such good-faith reliance, or merely preventing the
plaintiff from proving the opposite by clear and convincing
evidence, to be sufficiently burdensome that "a prophylactic
rule need be adopted sanctioning willful character-assassina-
tion so long as it is conducted on a massive scale."244 Given
the weak justification for protecting publishers of malicious
falsehoods, the governmental interest in First Amendment
aspects of libel-proof plaintiff cases cannot be said to be com-
pelling. Moreover, in Masson, the Supreme Court explicitly
rejected "any suggestion that the incremental harm doctrine
is compelled as a matter of First Amendment protection for
speech."245
Some proponents seek to justify the doctrine on the basis
that it "prevents the waste of judicial resources that would
occur if courts permitted fruitless claims to go to trial."
246 Ju-
dicial economy is a legitimate, if not an altogether compel-
ling, governmental interest. As Professor Tribe notes, "gov-
ernmental interest in efficiency, convenience, or cost-saving
may be cited in support of a challenged rule: strict scrutiny
would include judicial wariness of interests such as these
240. Buckley, 539 F.2d at 896 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 401 (1974)).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 24-35.
242. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated
on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
243. Id. at 1568.
244. Id.
245. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2436 (1991).
Presumably the Court did not mention the issue-specific branch of the libel-
proof plaintiff doctrine because the Ninth Circuit relied solely upon the incre-
mental harm branch in its decision below. Id.
246. The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, supra note 51, at 1917. "The libel-
proof plaintiff doctrine, when applied according to a clearly articulated set of
legal standards, assures that only plaintiffs with colorable reputational harm
go forward to the jury and thus permits courts to dispose of meritless claims at
an early stage." Id., at 1921.
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which can be so easily and indiscriminately invoked...
In his concurring opinion in Hudson v. McMillian,24 s Justice
Blackmun admonished that docket management issues have
"no appropriate role in interpreting the contours of a substan-
tive constitutional right."249 In any event, given the relative
scarcity of cases involving the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, its
abolition probably would not open the floodgates of litigation.
Thus, applying strict scrutiny under an Equal Protection
Clause analysis, the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine cannot be
said to further a compelling state interest.
Even if the state interest were compelling, however, the
doctrine fails the second prong of the strict scrutiny test: the
doctrine is not necessary to the furtherance of the state's in-
terest. Other means exist for conserving court time and pro-
tecting parties from frivolous litigation. As noted by the
Boddie Court, defendants can sue for malicious prosecution
or abuse of process. 250 Additionally, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure permit courts to impose sanctions on attor-
neys or parties who sign pleadings, motions, or other papers
not filed in good faith.25 ' Under Rule 11, for example, a per-
son signing a pleading, motion, or other paper in a case as-
serts (1) that he or she has read the document; (2) that to the
best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry, the document is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law (or by a good-faith argu-
ment for changing existing law); and (3) that the document is
not being filed for any improper purpose, including harass-
ment or causing unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation.25 2 Sections of Title 28 of the United
States Code authorize sanctions against attorneys who multi-
ply the proceedings in a case "unreasonably and vexatiously,"
by pleadings or otherwise; 25 3 and against parties proceeding
in forma pauperis who file actions that are "frivolous or mali-
247. TRIBE, supra note 177, § 16-6.
248. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
249. Id. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Hudson considered a prisoner's
substantive constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Id. at 997.
250. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971).
251. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
252. Id.
253. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1993).
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cious." 2 54 Sanctions can include costs, 255 expenses, 256 attor-
neys' fees,257 and dismissal of the case.258 State courts have
similar sanctioning powers that serve to deter meritless
suits. 25 9 Accordingly, the libel-proof plaintiff classification vi-
olates the Equal Protection Clause because it abrogates a
fundamental right and is not necessary to the achievement of
a compelling state interest.
IV. PROPOSAL
Because the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is judicially cre-
ated, it can and should be judicially abrogated. From its in-
ception, the doctrine was a "fundamentally bad idea";260 it
evolved into "a rather loose-woven legal conception of the fed-
eral courts" 26 1 that is both inequitable and unconstitutional.
Labeling a class of persons libel-proof denies them due
process and equal protection of the laws.262 Applying the
strict scrutiny standard for Equal Protection Clause analysis,
where a fundamental right such as due process is at stake,
governmental discrimination against so-called libel-proof
plaintiffs is invalid unless it is necessary to promote a com-
pelling state interest.26 3 Proponents of the libel-proof plain-
tiff doctrine assert that it somehow protects First Amend-
ment freedoms,264 and that it promotes judicial economy by
preventing fruitless claims from proceeding to trial.265 How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court severely undercut
any First Amendment justifications by stating that the doc-
254. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1993).
255. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1993).
256. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1993).
257. FED. R. Crv. P. 11; 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1993).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1993).
259. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5(a) (West Supp. 1993), which per-
mits trial courts to order 'a party, the party's attorney, or both to pay any rea-
sonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a re-
sult of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay." Id.
260. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
261. Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 932 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir.
1991).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 179-260.
263. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971).
264. See, e.g., Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
265. The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, supra note 51, at 1917.
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trine "is not compelled as a matter of First Amendment pro-
tection for speech."266
Even if the governmental interest in precluding frivolous
litigation were considered compelling, the libel-proof plaintiff
doctrine is not necessary to promote that interest. Instead of
denying libel plaintiffs due process and equal protection,
judges can grant directed verdicts for malicious prosecution
or abuse of process to defendants who establish that the
plaintiffs' claims are truly meritless.26 7 As to the potentially
chilling effect of defense costs in libel claims, defendant pub-
lishers in federal court can use Rule 11 to seek reimburse-
ment of their defense costs and attorneys' fees as sanctions if
the pleadings were signed without reasonable inquiry as to
their grounding in fact or in law, or if the pleadings were filed
for an improper purpose.2 8 Costs and attorneys' fees may
also be available as sanctions under Title 28, United States
Code § 1927 if plaintiffs' counsel multiplied the proceedings
to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously.26 9 In state
court, defendants can seek reimbursement of costs, expenses,
and attorneys' fees under the state's statutes governing frivo-
lous or vexatious litigation.2 7 0 Thus, numerous avenues are
open to libel defendants seeking to protect themselves
against meritless claims.
V. CONCLUSION
The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine should be abrogated as
unconstitutional and inequitable. As one commentator
noted, "It]he rapist or corporate plunderer does not lose his
inherent worth as a person by committing the wrongful act
.... The accused, innocent or guilty, retains the right to be
heard in court."271 So, too, should the libel plaintiff whose
reputation has been attacked. "Even a criminal or a cad may
have a vestige of honor that has been besmirched. It would
be consonant with general tort law to let the jury decide
266. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2436 (1991).
267. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971).
268. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
269. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1993).
270. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 128.5(a) (West Supp. 1993). Section
128.5(b)(2) defines "frivolous" as either "totally and completely without merit,"
or "for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 128.5(b)(2).
271. Collett, supra note 184, at 457.
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what, if any, harm was done to that sullied reputation. "272
Once the plaintiff has established that the defendant is a ma-
licious tortfeasor, the jury should have broad discretion in
measuring the plaintiffs damages.17 ' Defendants can pursue
other remedies if they believe libel plaintiffs' actions are
frivolous.2 7 4
If person X has $100 in her wallet and person Y steals
$99, X can sue Y for conversion. If X has $2 in her wallet and
Y steals $1, X can still sue Y for conversion. The courts do not
deny X a remedy simply because X had little to steal.275 Sim-
ilarly, the courts should not deny libel plaintiffs an opportu-
nity to present their case to a jury simply because a judge
subjectively decides the plaintiffs have little or no reputation
to lose. Such arbitrary and capricious denials protect pub-
lishers of malicious falsehoods and violate libel plaintiffs'
rights to due process and equal protection under the law.
Evelyn A. Peyton
272. Lois G. FORER, A CHILLING EFFECT: THE MOUNTING THREAT OF LIBEL
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273. Marder, supra note 14, at 1017.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 251-60.
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